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PROF. SOKOL:

Let me start by thanking

everyone here at Fordham who have put on a great

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

2

conference.

Let me thank the morning panelists and

the keynotes.

I think we’ve learned a lot.

Wonderful

presentations.
I think in many ways when people think about
populism and antitrust, the first thing that they
think about, since they don’t know anything about
antitrust or competition law, is think about their own
personal health.

Health care is a fascinating area,

and we’re going to get started now.
I have wonderful practitioners and
practitioners/academics on this panel, actually
technically two practitioners/academics because Scott
also spent a year here in New York.
To my immediate right I have Fiona from
Baker McKenzie, who has come all the way from Europe;
I have Scott, who has come all the way from downtown;
I have Steve, who has come from Washington, D.C.; and
I have Reiko, who has come from Tokyo.

Combined,

literally we span the world in terms of time zones.
With that, we are going to start by going
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into big-picture issues to frame the rest of the
discussion.
Scott, let me start with you.
PROF. HEMPHILL:

Great.

Thanks to Danny for

the introduction, and to James and the folks at
Fordham for organizing what’s always a really
outstanding conference.
I would like to spend the next few minutes
discussing two emerging issues that I think are of
great importance for health care and antitrust.
The first really isn’t a health care issue
at first blush at all, the recent AT&T/Time Warner
merger challenge by the DOJ.
odd place to start.
course.

It might seem like an

It’s not a health care merger, of

But the case has quite important implications

for health care that I want us to think a little bit
about.
Second, the increasingly aggressive approach
to monopsony — that is, to agreements and mergers that
harm sellers through the enhanced exercise of power by
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buyers.

This is already an important issue, and I

think it’s going to get bigger as time goes on.
Let me start with the AT&T/Time Warner
merger.

As this audience knows, Time Warner owns

Turner, a video programmer which operates several
networks, and AT&T owns DirecTV, a major video
distributor.

DOJ’s main argument in challenging the

merger has been that Turner’s common ownership with
DirecTV would lead Turner to raise its prices in its
license negotiations with other distributors.
This concern is based on an economic model,
a model of bargaining pioneered by John Nash, the
Nobel Prize winner.

In that Nash bargaining model

upstream and downstream firms negotiate over whether
the upstream firm’s products are included in a bundle
of inputs offered for sale by the downstream firm.
The model supposes that the parties bargain over the
division of surplus from reaching an agreement
compared to what each party would get if they failed
to reach a deal.
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To simplify it somewhat, the key issue in
these models is bargaining leverage, and bargaining
leverage affects the magnitude of the surplus the
parties divide and derives from each party’s outside
option — that is, their best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA), or their walkaway value
if the parties fail to reach a deal.
The anticompetitive effect of a merger in
these bargaining settings derives from the increased
bargaining leverage.

If a party can improve its

outside option through a merger or if it can worsen a
counterparty’s outside option, then the party can
increase its profits at the expense of the
counterparty.
As an example, imagine a negotiation over
whether the Turner networks will be included in some
other distributor’s offering to consumers — Dish, say.
If the negotiations failed, there would be what’s
called a “blackout” of Turner content on Dish.
In response to a blackout, some customers

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

6

would switch to DirecTV.

That is the key move that

drives DOJ’s argument here, which is that from
Turner’s perspective the extra benefit to DirecTV, now
a corporate affiliate, would soften the negative
consequences of a blackout and thereby improve
Turner’s outside option and enhance its bargaining
leverage in negotiations with Dish, giving it both the
incentive and the ability to insist on a higher price.
You know the conclusion of this story so
far, which is that the court rejected the conclusion
that Turner’s bargaining leverage would actually
increase post-merger.

The court reasoned that

blackouts are pretty costly to Turner, very costly,
and so a blackout would not be a credible negotiating
threat.

The court also observed that long-term

blackouts don’t happen that much in practice.
Here’s where health care antitrust comes in.
The economic theory of bargaining is also a powerful,
commonly used tool for evaluating health care mergers.
We see this all the time in hospital cases.
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of competing hospitals is typically analyzed by asking
whether the merger worsens the outside option of
payers, and thereby increases the hospital’s
bargaining leverage in negotiations.
The outside option changes because if the
insurer, the payer, fails to reach a deal, it’s now
missing multiple hospitals from its provider network
rather than just one.

The FTC’s successful stream of

hospital merger challenges, going back to ProMedica,
is premised on this theory.
So the AT&T court’s hostility to bargaining
theory may raise some questions about the use of this
model in other mergers, such as mergers of hospital or
mergers of payer.
To be sure, the AT&T opinion is the view of
a single district court in a particular factual
setting, and the district court did say that it
accepted the economic theory of bargaining.

In any

event, the district court doesn’t have the last word
here.

The case has been appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
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What I want to emphasize for those of us who
care about health care antitrust is that the D.C.
Circuit is now in a position to make a powerful
statement about the role of Nash bargaining in merger
analysis, with effects on health care, and really any
other industry where bargaining plays a major role.
The second item I want to touch on briefly
is the increased importance of monopsony and
allegations that agreements or mergers enhance a
firm’s ability to exercise such power.

By way of

disclosure on this issue, I’ve served as an expert in
litigation examining the alleged enhancement of
monopsony power.
As you all know, there has been a recent
resurgence of interest in monopsony.

DOJ has brought

cases alleging no-poaching/no-hiring agreements in
other areas, such as tech workers and rail equipment
suppliers.

These days we think of no-hire agreements

as being subject to criminal liability.
This is going to keep coming up in health
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care antitrust cases.

It came up in the Anthem/Cigna

merger challenge, which contained an allegation of
enhanced monopsony power.

It has been raised in the

context of FTC’s evaluation of pharmacy benefit
manager mergers.
There are a couple of things to keep in
mind, a couple of developments to keep an eye on for
the future.
First, as the DOJ continues to bring and win
these buy-side cases, settle favorably these buy-side
cases outside the context of health care, I think it
is going to become increasingly difficult for
defendants, for example in health care mergers, to
argue that squeezing suppliers through the reduced
rivalry of the purchasers is a source of
procompetitive benefit rather than itself being a
cognizable form of anticompetitive harm.
The second development to keep an eye on is
the prospect of Justice Kavanaugh.
middle of confirmation hearings.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

We’re in the
As a D.C. Circuit

10

judge, Judge Kavanaugh offered a view about monopsony
in the Anthem/Cigna merger.

For those of us who think

of monopsony as a real problem that we need to be
paying attention to, his views I think are halffull/half-empty.
On the one hand, the judge was very
concerned about the possibility of what economists
typically call enahnaced “classical monopsony power,”
as a harm that we would want to pay attention to in a
merger, and presumably in conduct cases as well.
He was a bit more cryptic on enhanced
bargaining power, I would say.

One reading of his

opinion is that he’s more skeptical that antitrust has
a role to play in those cases, a view that if it
became broadly shared by the Supreme Court might have
some important implications.
PROF. SOKOL:

Scott, that was a wonderful

overview.
We’re going to actually move time zones.
Reiko, I’d say the audience is least familiar with

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

11

developments in Japan, so I want to give you some time
to maybe fill us all in on what does health care mean
in a Japanese context.
MS. AOKI:

Thank you, Danny, for inviting me

to be part of this panel, and also Fordham for putting
on this lovely, very instructive conference.

I also

appreciate the opportunity to introduce you to the
health care market in Japan very briefly.
First of all, as many of you may know, many
markets in Japan are shrinking because our population
has started to shrink.

However, the health care

sector would be one of the few that is not shrinking,
and some markets, such as long-term care for the
elderly, are actually expanding markets.
First of all, everyone in Japan has publicly
funded health insurance, and this includes long-term
care.

Because the government is the insurer, the

retail price in health care is basically regulated by
the government, including pharmaceuticals.
Growing public expenditure on health care
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because of the increasing proportion of elderly in the
population and the price of health care is of great
concern to the government, which I think is common in
many countries.

There have been public policies,

therefore, to decrease price.

However, there is

reluctance in Japan to rely on competition to reduce
price based on the wrong belief that competition
reduces quality.

Also, there is skepticism about for-

profit organizations providing health care.
I already mentioned that pharmaceutical
prices are regulated.

They are reviewed twice a year

for generics and four times a year for pioneering
drugs.
Pioneering drug prices take into account the
price of same or similar therapy and class, both in
Japan and abroad, and foreign prices therefore are
very important for determining new drug prices.

I

thought this was very unique to Japan, but over lunch
I was talking to Fiona, and evidently this is an
international thing to look at the prices abroad, so
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there is nothing special about Japan there.
Generic drug prices in Japan are 50 percent
of the pioneering drug at the entry.

Currently,

generics have about 60 percent of the market, and the
government’s goal is 80 percent by 2020, and this is
probably achievable.
There were about 200 generic manufacturers
in 2007.

They all tend to be very small, about one-

tenth the capitalization of a pioneering drug company
on the average.

So, basically, generics are very

important to reduce price but they really don’t
provide any competition in terms of innovation to the
pioneering drug.
Wholesale prices are not regulated, and
therefore, with declining retail prices as government
policy, the wholesale margins are declining for the
wholesale companies.

However, they are protected by

separate pharmaceutical supply chain guidelines issued
by the Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare.

That

guideline tends to focus on protecting the small and
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medium generic firms and also the wholesale companies.
For those of you who know it, it has a flavor similar
to the subcontracting law that’s in Japan for
protecting medium and small businesses.
Long-term care in Japan is also regulated,
and in this case not just the output price but also
many of the input prices.

For instance, also the wage

of the long-term care service providers, the
individuals.
JFTC did a market study a few years ago
suggesting competition in the long-term care industry
was very limited.

For instance, long-term care market

entry is open only to nonprofit firms, subsidies by
local governments for long-term care are limited to
qualified institutions, and it is not possible to
provide funding and privately funded services together
in a single institution.

The report suggested that a

more procompetitive environment probably would help to
increase both the quality and price of long-term care.
But, as I mentioned before, the whole
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society is very skeptical about quality in
competition, and unfortunately this report was
criticized by many people and in the public.

I hope

that what I learn from this panel I can bring home and
try to increase the quality of health care in Japan.
Thank you.
PROF. SOKOL:

Thank you.

Now I want to move to the private practice
side, two practitioners who are both eminent, both at
global firms, who both know their jurisdiction, and,
simply because the firms are in fact global, know just
about every jurisdiction around the world.
Fiona, let me start with you.

Overview

thoughts.
MS. CARLIN:

It just so happens that this

year is the tenth anniversary of the EU Pharmaceutical
Sector Inquiry, a rather traumatic experience for
anyone who lived through it.

That sector inquiry was

looking at a dearth of innovation coming through the
pipeline as many blockbusters were coming off patent,
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and fears that originators were abusing the patent
system to stifle innovation as well as to delay
generic market entry.
In the last decade the tables have really
turned on the innovation front, and that’s a topic
that I’ll be talking about later.

Scientific

breakthroughs over the last couple of years really
mean that the debate today is no longer about where is
the innovation but can society actually afford to pay
for it.
Innovation is to be encouraged.

It is a

political priority of the European Commission, no
doubt for some of the reasons that were so eloquently
explained in the session before lunch.
We will talk about the novel innovation
theory of harm in the Dow/DuPont case.

That case also

triggered a lively debate on issues like the
commonality of shareholders in a sector and the role
of high margins in a sector.
High margins also feature in the enforcement

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

17

context.

We are just seeing the Commission’s first

foray into excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical
sector.

Those cases focus on generic conduct and

really bad behavior that doesn’t pass the smell test.
I don’t think the fact that the Commission
has just opened an investigation into Aspen means that
we will be seeing excessive pricing probes in the onpatent market anytime soon, but there is a lively
debate in Europe at the moment around pharmaceutical
pricing generally.
I think the uncontroversial piece in all of
this is that competition law does have an important
role to play in making sure that society benefits from
the savings to be accrued from early generic entry on
patent expiry.
On both sides of the Atlantic I think we’re
seeing a lot of enforcement in relation to life cycle
management strategies alleged to have crossed the
line, practices with highly suggestive names like
evergreening, product hopping, sham litigation, and
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denigration.

There is little time to get into most of

that today, but we will be talking about patent
settlement agreements with value transfers, and I’m
looking forward to a very interesting debate.
Thank you.
PROF. SOKOL:

Thank you, Fiona.

Steve, let me move on to you.
MR. SUNSHINE:

Thank you, Danny.

I am from Washington.

Some of the remarks

that I might make today could be deemed to be critical
of the Trump Administration, and I’m a bit concerned
about retaliation, so I thought, instead of speaking,
I would just write an anonymous op-ed.

You’ll see it

tomorrow in The New York Times.
I do think in the area of health care we
have a bit of a repeated game problem.
mentioned Nash bargaining.

Scott

I’ve learned everything

that I need to know about Nash bargaining from Russell
Crowe.

[Laughter]
I think that in health care we have some
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problems of a repeat game being played over and over.
We see that in mergers.

We see that in reverse

payments.
We have a lot of predictability.

We know

how the agencies are going to act in these areas.
That’s good in some respects, in that we have
predictability, but I’ll suggesttwo thoughts on those
areas.
One is that maybe we’re not getting the best
welfare-enhancing outcome in these reviews, in the
mergers, in reverse payments, and in other areas.
Second, some of the challenges that we are
facing — Fiona mentioned life cycle management, some
of these more advanced distribution issues — these
tools may not be all that well suited to deal with
concerns going forward.

So we’ll talk about

innovation, we’ll talk about competencies, and really
what leads to long-term development.
With that, I’d like to reserve my last
twenty seconds, Mr. Chairman.
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PROF. SOKOL:

Absolutely, and we’ll get to

that in the Q&A period.
We’ve heard hints of pay-for-delay.
Actually, Steve, let me start by coming back to you.
Let’s talk about pay-for-delay.
post-Actavis?

Where do we stand now

We’re now a few years into that.

Is it

more of the same?
MR. SUNSHINE:

Obviously, we’ve been in the

trenches on pay-for-delay, as you call it, for quite
some time.

I will disclose that I was part of the

initial Actavis case that went to the Supreme Court.1
I think the first lesion that we should all
learn from it is that this is largely a relic of the
past.

As far as we can really tell from the industry,

nobody is seriously doing these kinds of settlements
today.

In some ways you can say that the battle has

been won.

We’ll come back to that in a bit.
The cases that are going on in the private

sector, and I think there are close to eighteen now —

1

Fed Trade Comm’n. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013)
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and this may sound a bit like defense counsel bias,
and so if it does I hope you’ll pardon me in advance —
but I think those eighteen sets of class actions are
basically plaintiffs’ lawyers now making money off
settlement agreements that were all done at a time
when there was at least a legitimate argument that
these settlements were per se lawful if they were
within the scope of the patent.
There has been a lot of litigation back and
forth over all these settlements.

Almost all of them

are settlements that occurred before the Actavis case
was decided, and in fact I think almost all of them
were before the circuit split with the K-Dur opinion
in the Third Circuit.

So, just to get that out as

framework, we’re all fighting about the past on things
that aren’t happening anymore.
The Actavis decision as a decision is
amazingly successful in being completely ambiguous and
meaning to the reader whatever the reader wants to
behold.

There are issues that are being debated still
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to this day, with district courts coming out in
different places on a number of issues:
(1) Is it a rule of reason case or not?

If

you can show that a settlement is a penny over avoided
litigation cost, do you have an irrebuttable
presumption that the settlement must be adverse to
competition?
(2) Do patent merits actually matter?

We

have some cases saying that patent merits don’t matter
at all and some cases saying that you can infer by the
size of the payment whether patent merits are
relevant.

You have other cases that say it’s actually

an antitrust causation issue if the plaintiff can’t
show that the defendant was going to bring the product
to market.

These are still open issues.

(3) There is an open issue about market
definition: Do you need to define a relevant market?
What is the relevant market?

Is it the listed product

and an AB equivalent, or can you look at other
products that become involved?
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are going different ways on this direction.
The FTC is still fighting three of these
cases.

They’re fighting the AndroGel case, the AbbVie

case, and the Lidoderm case, so these cases are still
being litigated by the FTC, although there really
isn’t anything at stake in those cases per se other
than a clarification of the law.

Those markets have

cleared and have had generic entry.
What I worry about from reverse payments
going forward is Actavis was pretty clever in the way
that it tried to incorporate all of prior law in the
patent area and in the antitrust area, and Actavis
came to the conclusion that what had been a tension
between a patent’s innate right to exclude — obviously
that’s what a patent is — and antitrust principles,
that those two principles should be balanced.
In the Actavis decision there was an express
judgment that the policy of antitrust overcame some of
the rights of the patent holders.
novel concept.
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outside of the very narrow Hatch-Waxman context.
Courts have been slow to do that.
been argued in a few places.

It has

We will talk about some

of the other areas now where this highly activated
plaintiff’s antitrust bar, and the agencies for that
matter, are looking to provide some basis to say,
“Let’s get in and start picking winners and losers.
Let’s get in and start regulating innovation.

Let’s

get in and see if we can after the fact decide that,
‘Gee, there should have been a better outcome.’”
I think this is a very dangerous area going
forward.

Once we get out of the Hatch-Waxman context,

the tools that the plaintiffs were relying on —
mandatory state substitution, exact equivalence of
products because that’s what the Food and Drug
Administration requires — those are gone.

Then we’ll

be back to our basic antitrust tools that we’ve been
talking about.
I would like to go to the more general
question: Is the world a better place now that we have
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this rule about reverse payment settlements?

A

branded company making a settlement with a generic
should negotiate that settlement only on the basis of
entry date and avoided-litigation costs.
As I said, virtually all settlements have
gone in that direction.
settling cases.
payments.

That’s how they’re now

There are very few, if any, reverse

Is the world a better place?

I think that

question is still out for debate.
A client who I do a fair amount of work for,
Teva, the world’s largest generic manufacturer,
challenges patents as part of its business.

They have

an entire budget for developing abbreviated new drug
applications (ANDAs).

They have a litigation budget,

and they have a portfolio of cases that they have to
manage within that budget.
The question is: At the end of the day are
we shaving more years off patents and getting earlier
entry under the system we have today than under the
old system where settlements could be helped along by
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some kind of other payment or consideration?

I’m not

saying that the answer to that question is
unambiguously “Yes, we would,” but I’ve seen enough to
say: “Hm, that’s a good question.”
Look at Teva.

Its financial problems have

been all over the financial press.
their litigation budgets.
place.

It is constricting

It is in a much tougher

It can’t afford to litigate these cases.

simple case can cost $15 million.

A

Is that a better

outcome, to force them to litigate?
Branded companies have historically been
extremely risk-averse and happy to settle.

If you

make them litigate more cases to conclusion, are they
going to win more, and no years will be shaved off the
patent?
I think it’s very easy to focus after the
fact of a settlement and say, “Oh gosh, look at this
generic company out there trying to act for the
benefit of consumers.”

It is a private company that

invested its money, and to now say, “We think we can
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get a better outcome in this case after the fact,” I
think is a topic that is worth further study.
I will stop.
PROF. SOKOL:

Thank you.

That was great.

I used the non-neutral term pay-for-delay,
which you corrected me very nicely by calling it a
reverse payment.

We’ll call it reverse payment from

now because, regardless of what you read elsewhere in
the newspaper about what’s happening in the United
States, here at least we’re going to be civil.
Fiona, why don’t you offer us a European
perspective because reverse payments have also been
quite fascinating.

You’ve been also involved in these

issues.
MS. CARLIN:

In Europe we have two decisions

from the European Commission, both of which are under
appeal to the European courts, and a third case which
has recently been referred from the UK Competition
Appeals Tribunal for a preliminary ruling to the
European Court of Justice.
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I would describe the situation in Europe as
messy.
In the first Lundbeck decision of 2013, I
think the Commission shortcuts the analysis by
condemning reverse payment settlements as a
restriction of competition by object, to all intents
and purposes a per se infringement.

They achieved

that, I think, through a sleight of hand by
determining quite quickly that the originator and the
generics entering the market at risk during the period
of patent exclusivity were potential competitors.

It

follows from that conclusion that any agreement to
delay generic market entry can be equated with a
hardcore cartel.

With this, the burden of proof is

reversed, and the cards are firmly stacked.
The Lundbeck decision at the time was quite
surprising.

The facts around the settlement had been

on the radar of the competition authorities for years.
The 2004 Technology Transfer Block Exemption
Guidelines that were in place at the time stated quite
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clearly that “parties to a valid dispute that find
themselves in a one-way or two-way blocking position
cannot be considered as competitors.”
If you take that logic to the next step, it
would follow that, as long as there has been no fraud
in obtaining the patent and as long as the patent
dispute is a genuine dispute, the parties should be
free to settle without risking the cartel-style
prosecution of a by-object restriction.
In the subsequent decision one year later in
Servier, the Commission hedged its bets.

It

determined that the patent settlements in that case
were a restriction of competition by object, but also
by effect, and for good measure they threw in that it
was an abuse of a dominant position.
In the short time available I’m going to
briefly outline the main issues at the risk of
oversimplifying.
First, just a comment on the notion of
potential competitors.
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Lundbeck judgment of the General Court, which I think
regrettably is one of the worst judgments I’ve ever
read coming out of Luxembourg.

The court in that case

said: “Patents are presumed valid until they are
expressly revoked or invalidated by a competent patent
authority or court.”

So far, so good.

But then the circular reasoning comes in and
the court says: “This presumption of patent validity
cannot be equated with a presumption of illegality of
the generic products validly placed on the market
which the patent holder deems to be infringing.”
don’t know what to say to that logic.

I

I think generic

entry at risk cannot be considered lawful until proven
to be infringing without fundamentally undermining the
patent system.
The General Court then compounded the
problem in ruling that the patent holder cannot rely
on a subsequent ruling from a patent office upholding
the patent’s validity to escape the finding that the
generic at the time the agreement was signed was a
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potential competitor.
The Commission in the Lundbeck case
recognizes that settlements without financial
inducement are usually outside the scope of the
competition rules altogether.

It would seem then that

it’s the value transfer, it’s the monetary value
that’s transferring, that is sufficient to tip an
agreement outside the competition rules into a
hardcore cartel-type territory, and it’s not at all
clear why that’s the case.
Settlements within the scope of the patent
are limited to potentially infringing products.
Generics are free to enter with a noninfringing
product.

I don’t think that that situation meets the

standard of revealing a sufficient degree of harm to
competition to trigger a per se classification.
Post-Lundbeck but before the General Court’s
ruling in that case, the European Court of Justice
delivered a landmark ruling in the Cartes Bancaires
case.

That case ruled that the by-object
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classification requires a proper analysis of the
agreement, its objectives, the economic and legal
context, including a close look at the nature of the
goods affected and the real conditions of the
functioning and structure of the market in question.
The Lundbeck General Court pays lip service
to Cartes Bancaires but concludes that the citation
I’ve just mentioned does not concern the specific
category of an agreement in a particular sector, and
it is apparent from the broad logic of the
Commission’s decision that the Commission applied the
concept by-object in the economic and legal context.
In short, the General Court essentially disregarded
the Cartes Bancaires standards.
Another comment: Payments often reflect the
genuine legal uncertainty around the outcome of a
patent dispute, the patchy or nonavailability of
injunctive relief, and the asymmetric risk that the
parties are taking.

The generic has very little to

lose, but the originator stands to suffer irreparable
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harm because once an unlawful generic comes on the
market, the price falls, it never goes back up again,
and there are pricing repercussions in other markets
as a result of international reference pricing.

The

Commission and the General Court recognized this
irreparable harm but concluded that it is a “normal
commercial risk.”

In Europe we don’t have the Hatch-

Waxman clearing-the-way-type mechanism.
I think the General Court in Lundbeck
ignored Cartes Bancaires and ignored the legal and
commercial reality.
In the Servier decision, the Commission
repeats the same errors in the by-object analysis.

In

the by-effect analysis it compounds the problem by
cross-referring to the by-object analysis.

So if the

elimination of potential competition is the
counterfactual in the by-effect analysis, the rest is
a foregone conclusion.
I’m not going to get into the market
definition and the dominance issues, but all of those
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issues are now pending before the Court of Justice in
the reference from the UK Competition Appeals Tribunal
that was made in March.

The fact that that reference

has been made just confirms that Lundbeck is not fit
for purpose.
To conclude, I think the challenge is to
craft a by-effect standard for these types of
agreements that allows us to distinguish a patent
settlement that is a blatant cartel from a patent
settlement that is a perfectly reasonable way of
resolving the uncertainties of patent litigation
without getting into an assessment of the validity or
value of the patents in dispute.
I’ll stop there.
PROF. SOKOL:

Thank you.

Apparently there is a lot of clarity in law
and policy both in the States and in Europe is how I
would summarize our discussion up until now.
Reiko, I’m sure Japan is just as clear in
terms of what’s going on, yes?
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MS. AOKI:

Actually, it is.

PROF. SOKOL:

Okay.

That’s worth writing

for Global Competition Review (GCR) and MLex and
anyone else who’s here.

I just want to make sure.

Okay, go ahead.
MS. AOKI:

I’ll first explain to you how it

works in Japan.
In Japan regarding generics there is a
policy called “patent linkage for generic drugs.”
This says that the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Device
Agency (PMDA) will approve a generic only after the
substance patent and the pharmaceutical patent, the
efficacy patent, have expired, and this is exactly to
avoid infringement disputes.
But the outcome of this rule is that it is
basically the same as reverse payments in that it
delays entry, so the consumers are just the same as in
the world of reverse payments.

The only difference is

how the surplus is split between the pioneering drug
manufacturer and the generic manufacturer.
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there is no payment from the pioneering drug to the
generic manufacturer.

The pioneering drug keeps all

the surplus from the prolonged monopoly.
It goes back to the question that Steve
posed: Is the world better off with reverse payments?
You can have a very clear system, like Japan, but
there is still much to be warranted in terms of trying
to increase the consumer surplus.
The JFTC did a study about generic drugs and
innovation.

I won’t go into the details, but partly

due to this rule that they have there, the generic
manufacturers really don’t pose any threat to the
pioneering drug manufacturers in terms of innovation.
They showed empirically the variable that seemed to
affect the R&D expenditure of pioneering drugs is
actually competition abroad; if they have large sales
abroad, then their R&D is large.

But the existence of

generic drug manufacturers or how many generic drugs
have entered the market doesn’t seem to affect the
innovativeness of the pioneering drug.
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I’ll stop there.
PROF. SOKOL:

Thank you.

We’re going to now move from reverse
payments to something else that I think is very
exciting for people, mergers.

Once again, I’m going

to start with Steve, who still has twenty seconds left
that I haven’t forgotten about.

Reiko has some time

left, too; I’ll give that back to her.

James will

tell me when we’re really going to stop based on any
number of things, but we’re not there yet.
Steve.
MR. SUNSHINE:

Thank you.

Mergers is a topic near and dear to my
heart.

I think in the area of mergers health care is

pretty fascinating for a number of reasons.
Let me start first with pharma.

In the

United States it’s almost unique — perhaps it is
unique.

We have to do a comprehensive survey, but we

also know the future in the pharmaceutical world.
Why do we know that?
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pipeline is so gosh-darned long.

We know for a

product that, once it gets out of research and into
the clinic, we have five or six years to see.

Usually

antitrust enforcers would look and say two years is a
pretty good framework.

The Merger Guidelines seem to

favor that approach, obviously longer in places.
We know all about potential competition.
arguably know all about innovation.

We

So we have this

great crystal ball.
The FTC reviews pharma mergers in the United
States.

The FTC acknowledges, “Well, of course

projects in development fail,” but the FTC’s position
— and I don’t think it’s incorrect — is: “As long as
the project has some reasonable probability of coming
to success we want to preserve it, and so we want to
continue to treat it as a separate asset.”

Whether

you call it a potential competition theory or an
innovation theory, we have this crystal ball that
allows us to look into the future.
However, we have a second problem in the
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pharmaceutical area:it’s one of the most inelastic
markets out there.

There are certainly examples where

drugs compete with one another — I’m not saying that
they’re not — but there are so many instances with our
system, with multiple payers, with the physicians
having tremendous input, where a decision is really
not made on the basis of price.

That leads to

extremely narrow markets.
We have some precedents that say the market
has to be the same molecule, it has to be the same
mechanism of action, it has to be the same indication,
but we’re left with this very narrow look at what
markets are.
That means that if two pharmaceutical
companies are going to merge, it’s actually pretty
easy to go through and say: “You are going to have
problems here, here, here, and here.
worry.

But not to

These are pretty narrow products.

divest the smaller of the two.

We’ll just

We’ll get our $20,

$30, $40 billion merger though, and we’ll have to sell
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a dozen products or whatever.

Life goes on.”

From a

merging company’s perspective that’s great.
There are questions.
bigger picture?

Are we missing the

Are there areas where companies have

unique competencies that really can’t bring those
products to market?

As a random example, say that

there are only three or four companies that can really
make vaccines.

Should we think about vaccines in some

broader area of competency?
The problem in most of health care is that a
lot of the big companies now are actually exiting out
of early-stage research, and that’s being done more
and more in universities and small startups and in
other kinds of areas.

So you don’t necessarily have a

match of all the assets that you would look for in a
true innovation market.
If I think back to some of the innovation
market work that the DOJ was doing in the mid-1990s,
they were looking at identifying sources of innovation
and trying to find areas where there were very limited
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sources of innovation.

In early pharmaceutical

development maybe there are a lot of sources of
innovation out there, so you want to look in these
areas at where there are sets of competencies where if
you don’t have that set of competencies, you can’t
bring those products to market.
In the area of oncology and big molecules,
it is very difficult to understand how two molecules
are actually going to act inside of a patient.

That’s

why to this day we don’t have generic biologicals,
because how you cook the molecule actually matters.
These are enormous molecules compared to the
traditional ones, and it’s not just what they are
constituted of, but it’s actually their structure and
their polarity, and they may act completely
differently inside the body.

If you do that, you

almost get to the area of saying each molecule is its
own market, and we know where that leads us.
One area in pharma now that is becoming more
and more of an issue is the question of collaborations
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and combination products because these large molecules
treating things like antivirals or oncology discovered
that putting some of these products together is the
way to get the best patient outcomes.

So if Large

Pharma Company A is developing molecule A and Large
Pharma Company B is developing molecule B, they don’t
compete, but together they form a very good
combination drug that really knocks out the disease.
Is it a good thing that they merge?

What

about Companies C, D, and E out there that may have
one of those two complements that is arguably a better
product — or a worse product — that are now being
denied access?

So we are going back to all of those

vertical theories that we have talked about before in
an area where it is very difficult to predict the
future.
I agree with Scott that the AT&T/Time Warner
decision is not going to provide any precedent going
forward.

I do think, in fairness to the case and to

DOJ and to Dr. Shapiro, who testified for the DOJ, the
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bargaining model was completely accepted by the court.
The problem was that the results of the bargaining
model were a very small anticompetitive effect, and
there was a lot of evidence in dispute about: (1) the
dynamics of the market that might overcome it; and (2)
the efficiencies.
I think what the court did was a very
careful balancing of reams and reams of evidence.

If

I was to criticize DOJ, it was almost too much
reliance on Dr. Shapiro and not enough on other kinds
of evidence that would support that overall
conclusion.

As a result, in AT&T/Time Warner what we

got was one case where there was no really new law
developed and there was a failure of proof without a
rejection of the bargaining model as a theory.
If I use my additional one minute and twenty
seconds and I translate that into the health care
area, I think we are going to have the same proof
problems in some of these areas in oncology where
these products often are not even in patients yet, or
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they are in early-stage studies where maybe fourteen
patients have been treated.

Therefore, understanding

what the effects of these mergers are going to be in
these very early-stage markets will be extremely
difficult.
I worry about the other side of innovation,
which is getting companies to invest in these
enormously expensive projects.
Let me stop there.
PROF. SOKOL:

Thank you.

That’s really a

spectacular overview.
I’m going to mix things up.

Instead of

going to Fiona next, I’m going to go to Reiko next.
That way it stays exciting.
MS. AOKI:

I am going to say something

different from what I’ve prepared.

I was going to

briefly go over the mergers in Japan, but I don’t
think there is anything special about them.
The one thing I do know is that in Japan
only firms are required to report mergers in advance
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and be examined for questionable mergers.

But in

Japan, as I said, for-profits are under suspect, so
all hospitals in Japan are called “medical service
agencies.”

For that reason, hospital mergers are

never examined in Japan.

That’s something that is

unique to Japan.
I would just like to go back to the first
comment that Steve made about how narrow the
pharmaceutical market was.

Pharmaceuticals are only a

part of a broad spectrum of different methods of
addressing an ailment, and actually there are choices
other than just giving drugs to a patient to fix the
ailment.
Should the market be defined perhaps even
larger — to fix a particular disease you can use this
drug or do this exercise or eat this or that — and
shouldn’t that be the whole market?

In that case,

perhaps drugs are costing too much compared to the
alternatives.
This vast investment that you mention that
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has to be recovered maybe socially is an unnecessary
investment when you just concentrate on fixing the
particular disease.

It’s just a comment, and that’s

all I wanted to say.
Thank you.
PROF. SOKOL:

Great, thank you.

Fiona?
MS. CARLIN:

There is a bit of a cottage

industry opening up in Europe at the moment looking at
consolidation and innovation in the pharmaceutical
sector.
The trend started in 2016 with two
economists from the Düsseldorf Economics Institute
publishing a paper where they said they looked at
sixty-five pharma mergers and found that every single
one of them reduced competition and innovation between
the merging parties.

They went further and noted that

average patenting and R&D expenditure fell across the
relevant sector, not just between the merging parties,
by more than 20 percent within four years of any deal.
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The European Commission has a tender out for
a study on the impact of more than one hundred pharma
mergers between 2010 and 2013.

I think we can expect

a lot of debate going forward on these studies and
what conclusions can safely be drawn from them.
I just wanted to point out very quickly the
new German and Austrian deal value thresholds that
have recently entered into force.

I am not going to

get into the details, but just flag them for people
who may not be aware that they catch not only the
acquisition of biotech startups potentially but also
the acquisition of IP portfolios and even, if I’ve
understood correctly, exclusive IP licenses.

That’s

just something to be aware of.
Those types of laws are likely to be copied
elsewhere.

I think the Koreans are already

legislating similarly.

I think you might ask the

question whether it’s using a sledgehammer to crush a
nut, whether it’s a proportionate response to a
perceived gap in the current rules.
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doesn’t make life any simpler in relation to companies
seeking to do transactions.
I want to spend the majority of my time on
the innovation theory of harm in Dow/DuPont.

I think

it’s an astonishing case in many ways.
The Commission will say I’m exaggerating,
that “Dow/DuPont was very fact-specific, there were
lots of bad internal documents showing plans to
drastically cut R&D expenditure, and that the economic
theories developed in the decision are really just
there to lend a bit of rigor to the legal analysis,
and that no early economic model was actually applied
in the case — so, Fiona, don’t worry.”
I take some reassurance from that response
from the Commission, but I do think it is important to
have a proper debate about the issues raised.

Just a

couple of points.
The decision in Dow/DuPont relies very
heavily on the economic literature to establish a
presumption of harm in concentrated sectors with high
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entry barriers, high contestability, high
appropriability, and a high degree of cannibalization
between the products of the merging party.
To me that describes most innovative
sectors, not just crop science, but pharma, industrial
engineering, tech, and chemicals.

So broad

application, and that’s why I think this needs a
debate.
Second, the case goes far beyond the
conventional approach, looking at overlaps in product
and product pipelines, and goes right back to the
research direction of travel at the basic R level in
the R&D.

So the question is not whether the companies

merging have competing molecules in development but
whether they are researching a solution to the same
problem.
The notion of innovation spaces comes in.
They are not markets, but apparently that does not
prevent the Commission from assessing the impact of
the merger on the level of innovation efforts not only
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between the merging parties but also across the
sector.
My favorite paragraph of the decision is
Paragraph 3053.

I’m going to quote it if I may:

“Although the Commission cannot identify precisely
which early pipeline product or research the parties
would discontinue or defer or redirect, and thus which
innovation spaces would be harmed, the Commission
nonetheless considers that the reduction in innovation
effort by the parties would affect a large number of
innovation spaces.”
I think that is problematic because, with
this presumption of harm in an undefined innovation
space that doesn’t constitute a market, the burden of
proof switches to the parties to come up with
quantifiable, verifiable efficiencies arguments to
offset that presumption, and that simply cannot be
done.
The decision also is quite interesting in
that it assumes harm in the overall sector in which
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the merger is taking place and for good measure a lot
of other stuff is thrown in there.

The Commission

notes that past consolidation in the crop science
sector meant that the Big Five had reduced their R&D
spend as a percentage of revenue by 1.7 percent over
the last eight years; output had decreased but
profitability had increased; R&D spend in Europe
fifteen years ago used to be 33 percent of the total —
that was down to 10 percent by 2010.

Common

institutional investors holding minority shareholdings
across competitors was also flagged as a problem.

So

a lot of stuff in there, none of which was apparently
relevant to the ultimate outcome of the case.
The debate is not going away, and I don’t
think it’s limited to the specifics of Dow/DuPont.
The Commission’s Chief Economist last summer
came out with two papers further developing the model,
and this summer some leading independent academics
from some of the leading universities in Europe
critiqued the Commission’s economist’s work and have
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concluded that presumptions are immature and that more
economic work, including empirical work, needs to get
done to develop a proper theoretical framework for any
basis of an innovation theory of harm in merger
control.
They point out some of the features that the
initial modeling of the Commission did not consider,
and if Danny will give me two minutes, I’ll tell you
what they are.
PROF. SOKOL:
MS. CARLIN:

Yes.
Just one or two examples.

The first is that there is a possibility
that a merger actually incentivizes innovation where
the merging parties seek higher profits through
product differentiation as a way of avoiding
cannibalization.

That’s one new element.

Streamlining R&D efforts within the merged
entity can actually help parties be better placed to
win an R&D race in certain circumstances.

R&D

insights shared between the merging parties may be
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nonrival and applicable over a broader range of
products and encourage demand, expanding innovation
and not just increased profits.
Those are some of the additional factors
that the academics conclude should not be considered
second-order effects and relegated to an efficiencies
defense.

It is really important that they are brought

into the front end of the analysis.
I think the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Secretariat’s paper that was
published around the June 2018 meeting on this topic
does suggest that efficiencies arguments should be
considered at the same time as innovation harm and
there should be a neutral presumptive approach.

It

would be really helpful if the European Commission
would endorse that that is indeed the correct
conceptual framework.
In short, while economists debate these
interesting theories, in practice companies
contemplating a merger, especially in regulated
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sectors with high margins and strong patent
protection, should expect ever-closer scrutiny.
Just a note by way of an anecdotal bit of
fun at the end.

In clearing the Bio/Monsanto deal,

the European Commission’s press release proudly noted
that the Commission had reviewed 2.7 million internal
documents.

That’s problematic, but also problematic

are these theories that have simplistic presumptions
and that put the burden on the merging parties.
It is worrying because in Europe effectively
there is no judicial review of merger control.

I

think, therefore, it is incumbent on the Commission to
take a very disciplined approach when it comes up with
these types of theories.
I am not saying that innovation is not a
genuine area for exploration, but, because of the lack
of effective judicial review, I think real discipline
and much further study needs to be done.
Thank you.
PROF. SOKOL:
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Fiona started us off by talking about a
study from the economist of Dynamic Integrated
Climate-Economy (DICE).

I think we can suggest that

her comment — intervention essentially — is DICE/noDICE.

[Laughter]
I want to continue with that metaphor with

Scott, who starts at no-DICE and moves to DICE.
me explain.

Let

For the first six years of Scott’s career

I would say the R&D was primarily in reverse payments,
a series of papers.

This gets adopted in terms of the

framework of the FTC in many of their cases that they
keep on losing — no DICE.
Then, all of a sudden, something happens.
It turns out Scott may have been right, where the FTC
starts winning, and then we see ultimately victory in
Actavis, and now we’re in the world of DICE.
Steve told us that there is lack of clarity.
But it turns out that, DICE or no-DICE, Scott probably
has some thoughts on how things have developed.
Scott.
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PROF. HEMPHILL:

A couple of thoughts.

First, I’m happy to use the term “reverse
payments” to satisfy Danny and it sounds like others
on the panel.

I think it’s fair to say, though, that

in cases where it is in fact so that the brand pays
the generic hundreds of millions of dollars to stay
out of the market until patent exploration, and if we
all agree that those are the facts, let’s imagine that
is reasonably accurately described as paying for
delay.

At least in those circumstances we could agree

that that would be an okay label.
I was struck, Steve, by your comment that,
if I caught it right, that generics like Teva are
highly risk-averse.

That may well be right.

MR. SUNSHINE:

Brands, I said.

PROF. HEMPHILL:
about generics as well?
You’re on brand then.

I thought you were talking
No, just brands.

Okay.

Most commonly plaintiffs are

arguing that generics are on the risk-averse side.
I’m struck by Steve’s comment wondering
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whether we’re in a better place after all of this
fighting.

I think there are a few good reasons to

think yes.
One, there is just a straight prediction of
economic theory, which I think is pretty robust, that
if payment is permitted, that brands will have an
incentive to pay, pay, pay, pay for the generic to
stay out until patent exploration.

When you recognize

that often these cases involve multiple patents with
overlapping entry dates, where the equilibrium leads
is it could be a date that’s pretty far out.
This isn’t just economic theory.

In some of

these case — not all of these cases — we have pretty
good documentary evidence.

I’ve been involved with

some of these cases that what the parties really
understood was that they were either taking a payment
or making a payment in order to induce or accept a
pretty extensive delay.
Finally, I think there is a certain “proof
is in the pudding.”
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One, we no longer, I think, see some of the
very extreme settlements that we once upon a time saw.
By way of disclosure, I worked as a plaintiff’s expert
in one of these very old cases from the 1990s, Cipro,
which involved the hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars
payment that I have in mind.

I am not aware of any

post-Actavis — or for that matter post-K-Dur —
settlements where a brand would pay a generic nearly
$400 million to stay out until the expiration of the
last patent, more or less.
That could be regarded as a benefit aside
from the markers that we’re laying down for what the
rules of the road look like in the future.
This is for me a very provocative question,
are we better off?

I think there is a source for

doubt — although I’m not sure it’s Steve’s source —
which is you can do a lot of work — or harm or damage,
depending on how you look at it — without using an
observable payment.

This tracks a little bit the

defense to cartel cases that goes, “Well,
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interdependence is really easy in this market, and so
therefore we could achieve elevation without the
communications that you caught us making.”

Are things

that much worse in the cartel world than they would be
in the but-for world?
Here I think it is the case that a generic,
even if limited to the instrument of selecting an
entry date, has an incentive to take a late entry date
simply by virtue of dialing up its probability of
getting the 180 days from whatever it would do — I
will say “rolling the dice” in litigation, versus
feeling pretty comfortable in a settlement that they
will actually be able to come in on some date certain.
That outcome can in fact be worse from a
consumer welfare standpoint than litigation.

That

raises the question: “What are ultimately the
incremental welfare effects of getting rid of cash
payments but still having a variety of other
instruments to reach a settlement potentially with
adverse effects to consumers?
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MR. SUNSHINE:
was provocative.

First of all, I’m glad that I

At least I accomplished one of my

goals for today’s discussion.
I hear Scott’s argument.
before.

I’ve heard it

My criticism of the argument is that he is

taking a microscope and looking just at the exit out
of patent litigations and not looking at the bigger
picture, which is the question: How many patent
litigations are brought, how many investments are made
in R&D, and are we achieving the right balance between
innovation and years off the patent?
It is easy to say after people have made
investments, after people have committed to
litigation, that you don’t like the exit strategy out
of a particular settlement, but I submit that misses
the bigger question of are we achieving the right
balance.
I think there is a whole other question.
Our patent system is generally conceived to be too
permissive; we patent too many things.
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the right balance on the ability to challenge those?
How do we incent the generics to basically do those
challenges and to get out of those questions?

I think

that looking just at the exit is too narrow of a
question.
The second thing is I agree with Scott that
if a brand company pays hundreds of millions of
dollars, let’s say, a day before the patent expires
and gives them cash or bullion or whatever, that
that’s anticompetitive.

I’m not here arguing that it

should be per se legal.
But I think if you take the Actavis case
itself and you ignore the facts that the Supreme Court
assumed — which actually were not in the complaint and
incorrect — there was actually no cash paid in the
Actavis case.

There was a co-promotion agreement that

was entered simultaneously that had value to it for
sure.

The question is how much value was in it, but

the estimates of the value of that case are still
being litigated.
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less than $100 million for a product where, even under
the settlement agreement, five years were shaved off
the patent.
It seems to me a true rule of reason
analysis would allow those elements to be examined and
discussed in a lot more detail.
PROF. SOKOL:

Thank you, Steve.

I’ll take questions.
MR. KEYTE:

I’ll start with one.

the bargaining issue in mergers.

It’s on

I’ll give it to

Scott, who described it in detail.
Doesn’t that kind of theory just open up the
merger world back to potential conglomerate mergers
and portfolio effects?

Essentially, it doesn’t really

matter if the firms involved are competitors.

The

hospitals cannot even be competitive in terms of the
historical overlaps.

As long as they are dealing with

the same insurance company, the company is bargaining.
Therefore, Section 7 just turns into
essentially condemning increases in bargaining
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leverage irrespective of the underlying competition
and lines of commerce.

Is that a concern?

PROF. HEMPHILL:

I don’t think that’s a fair

characterization, at least of the cases that have been
brought.

I think I understand where you’re going.
In the real-world cases that we have seen,

the firms that we are talking about actually are
rivals for inclusion in the counterparty’s bundle.
You can imagine if I’ve got this network, maybe I
don’t need this other network; if I’ve got this
hospital, maybe I don’t need this other hospital.

We

don’t in those cases necessarily confront your parade
of horribles.
But certainly it is true that one can
construct models and come up with empirical results
where the hospitals could be across the country and
they are still jointly bargaining for inclusion, and
then there may be an improvement in your bargaining
position by virtue of affecting outside options.
In those cases I understand the point that
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the way in which we normally talk about competition is
in some sense attenuated.
There is a version of this in some of the
Federal Communications Commission’s

broadcast double

options where there is some evidence. I wrote a
working paper on this topic. I think they observe
effects both within the same municipality, within the
same metropolitan statistical area, but also across
them.

In that latter case, I think one is forced –

the FCC, not Clayton Act necessarily — to confront
exactly the point that you’re raising.
MR. KEYTE:

I think it’s something to watch

for, given how the law went away from attacking
conglomerate mergers and the idea of post-merger
bundling can be taken care of by other statutes.
PROF. HEMPHILL:

But just to be clear, I

think it is common ground between us that the actual
FTC cases that have been brought — and, for that
matter, payer mergers like Anthem/Cigna — do not raise
the conglomerate concern that you are raising.
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MR. KEYTE:

Only by focusing essentially on

the insurance companies that can be very powerful
themselves rather than the consumers that are actually
getting the services, and that seems to be a road that
can be applied to any number of things where there is
not real consumer-level competition.
PROF. SOKOL:

I want to wrap up.

wonderful panel discussion.
over cocktails.

This was a

We are going to continue

But that’s what you are really

wondering about, competition in health care.

The

competition I want to focus on now is red versus
white, Argentine versus French versus German versus
Spanish in terms of wines.
James, do you want to have some final
comments?
MR. KEYTE:

No, I don’t.

It has just been a wonderful day.
very full day, and thank you everybody.

It was a

I think it

was great attendance, and everybody paid great
attention to these wonderful panels, and this was a
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fantastic panel to end the day on.
Move on over to cocktails, please, and then
I hope to see you all tomorrow.

We have two other

great keynotes and two other great panels tomorrow
morning.

I’ll see you at cocktails.
[Adjourned:
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4:37 p.m.]

